What on earth just happened? Trump, Iran, and the unlikely ceasefire
Yesterday began with Donald Trump issuing genocidal threats against Iran on social media and ended—just ten hours later—with the announcement of a 14-day ceasefire, on Iran’s terms. Even by the volatile standards of Trump’s presidency, the whiplash is extraordinary. What, then, have the two sides actually agreed to—and what might it mean?
In a subsequent post, Trump asserted that Iran had agreed to keep the Strait of Hormuz open during the two-week pause in hostilities. Negotiations, he added, will proceed over that period on the basis of Iran’s 10-point plan, which he described as a “workable” foundation for talks.
Those 10 points are:
1. The US must fundamentally commit to guaranteeing non-aggression.
2. Continuation of Iran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.
3. Acceptance that Iran can enrich uranium for its nuclear program
4. Removal of all primary sanctions on Iran.
5. Removal of all secondary sanctions against foreign entities that do business with Iranian institutions.
6. End of all United Nations Security Council resolutions targeting Iran.
7. End of all International Atomic Energy Agency resolutions on Iran’s nuclear program.
8. Compensation payment to Iran for war damage.
9. Withdrawal of US combat forces from the region.
10. Cease-fire on all fronts, including Israel’s conflict with Hezbollah in Lebanon.
The United States has not, of course, signed on to all ten points. But the mere fact that Iran’s framework will anchor the negotiations amounts to a significant diplomatic victory for Tehran. More striking still, according to the Associated Press, Iran will retain control of the Strait during the ceasefire and continue—alongside Oman—to collect transit fees from passing vessels. In effect, Washington appears to have conceded that reopening the waterway comes with tacit recognition of Iran’s authority over it.
The geopolitical consequences could be profound. As Mohammad Eslami and Zeynab Malakouti note in Responsible Statecraft, Tehran is likely to leverage this position to rebuild economic ties with Asian and European partners—countries that once traded extensively with Iran but were driven out of its market over the past 15 years by U.S. sanctions.
Iran’s calculus is not driven solely by solidarity with Palestinians and Lebanese. It is also strategic. Continued Israeli bombardment risks reigniting direct confrontation between Israel and Iran—a cycle that has already flared twice since October 7. From Tehran’s perspective, a durable halt to its conflict with Israel is inseparable from ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. This is not an aspirational add-on; it is a prerequisite.
The forthcoming talks in Islamabad between Washington and Tehran may yet falter. But the terrain has shifted. Trump’s failed use of force has blunted the credibility of American military threats, introducing a new dynamic into U.S.-Iran diplomacy.
Washington can still rattle its saber. But after a failed war, such threats ring hollow. The United States is no longer in a position to dictate terms; any agreement will have to rest on genuine compromise. That, in turn, demands real diplomacy—patience, discipline, and a tolerance for ambiguity—qualities not typically associated with Trump. It may also require the participation of other major powers, particularly China, to help anchor the process and reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict.
Above all, the ceasefire’s durability will hinge on whether Trump can restrain Israel from undermining the diplomatic track. On this point, there should be no illusions. Senior Israeli officials have already denounced the agreement as the greatest “political disaster” in the country’s history—a signal, if any were needed, of how fragile this moment may prove to be.
Even if the talks collapse—and even if Israel resumes its bombardment of Iran—it does not necessarily follow that the United States will return to war. There is little reason to believe a second round would produce a different outcome, or that it would not once again leave Iran in a position to hold the global economy hostage. In that sense, Tehran has, at least for now, restored a measure of deterrence.
One final point bears emphasis: this elective war was not only a strategic blunder. Rather than precipitating regime change, it has likely granted Iran’s theocracy a renewed lease on life—much as Saddam Hussein did in 1980, when his invasion enabled Ayatollah Khomeini to consolidate power at home.
The magnitude of this miscalculation may well puzzle historians for decades to come.
If you would understand that US Vs Iran was a subplot in the bigger US Vs China proxy war, you will have your answer.
US Vs Venezuela was US Vs China proxy 1.0 and US Vs Iran was US Vs China proxy 2.0.
I wrote about it on Substack and X earlier today. Here it is:
"The 2 week ceasefire between the US and Iran, announced overnight on 08 April 2026, attributed to the intervention of Pakistan, is really one where Pakistan was the intermediary between China-Iran on one hand and US-Israel-GCC on the other.
In time this will come out.
The draft from that originated from Pakistan was likely drafted in both Washington and Beijing.
It’s Pakistan playing the same part as it did in the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué agreed by President Nixon following the secret visit of Kissinger to China via Pakistan in 1971.
Like then, Pakistan played a part because it had a foot in both camps. A friendly neighbour to China and a US ally. Now it’s part of both China-Pakistan and US-Saudi Arabia-Pakistan.
Both Iran and Venezuela were subplots in the larger plot of US vs China over the growing CNY based swap facility that challenges the USD’s status as number one reserve currency, and therefore challenges the US at every level. The alternative to the USD is not one China chose willingly but as a response to the weaponisation of the USD by the US. This was an own self goal by the US.
This alternative mechanism to the USD lies at the heart of China’s international trade, capital investment, and development of other markets through the Belt and Road initiative. Remember both Venezuela and Iran are major oil producers who were settling most of their oil exports away from the USD.
By hitting them, the US hit China hard. These were no isolated events or interventions.
That larger war, US Vs China, has not gone away. The US will go and lick its wounds and consider what to do. Having upset NATO and European allies, it now has some thinking to do - necessarily to move away from the neocon think-tank driven framing that has dominated since 2021, and peddled by individuals such as Niall Ferguson.
Will it be more US misadventures or will it now consider a version of Shanghai Communiqué 1972 version 2.0?
Is the US capable of a shift back to Nixon-Kissinger 1972?
PS: So far, all excitable social media types/influencers, or self appointed wise gurus, have not mentioned China. Today, Nassim Taleb wrote that no one knows how wars end. But apart from this pointless wisdom, both the start of the US Iran war and how it likely ends was visible if you focused on facts, and chose from different mental pictures to find the most coherent one.
It’s not over yet, of course, especially if Israel is not fully on board. But it might buy time for better negotiations."
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Substack link:
https://nasirafaf.substack.com/p/us-vs-china-isnt-over-yet?utm_source=share&utm_medium=android&r=6dx178
What makes it unlikely that the US and Israel—who have twice in the last year conducted diplomatic negotiations with Iran, only to begin wars during these—will simply do the same, again?