The US-Saudi nuclear deal makes no sense

How will Washington get Tehran to accept intrusive inspections beyond the JCPOA when Saudi is offered enrichment with no IAEA inspections?

AP Photo/Evan Vucci

A few points on the shocking U.S.–Saudi nuclear deal announced.

1. This reflects a weaker American bargaining position, not a stronger one.

The broader context is China. The Biden administration pursued a nuclear deal with Saudi Arabia, as part of a broader expansion of Trump’s Abraham Accords, in part to pull Riyadh closer to Washington and away from Beijing. But Washington’s position has deteriorated since then. The credibility of the U.S. security umbrella has weakened, GCC states have become more strategically autonomous, and Saudi Arabia has gained leverage by diversifying its partnerships.

The result appears to be that Washington had to offer substantially more to try to keep Saudi from drifting further toward China, while getting substantially less in return.

2. By any historical standard, this is an extraordinary Saudi victory.

Compared to previous negotiations, Riyadh has secured remarkable concessions. It no longer appears to have to normalize relations with Israel as part of the package. It is reportedly not required to sign a traditional Section 123 agreement that would deprive KSA of enrichment technology. And there are no comprehensive IAEA safeguards comparable to those Washington has long insisted upon elsewhere.

If these reports hold, Saudi Arabia has achieved what few thought Washington would ever accept.

3. Biden was going down the same path…

The Biden administration reportedly considered similar arrangements, but its efforts were derailed by the repercussions of the October 7 attacks.

Biden officials also understood the risks, although it did not prevent them from pursuing it and signalling willingness to offer Saudi major nuclear concessions. Some of the contingency ideas reportedly discussed bordered on the surreal: having American troops physically guard Saudi enrichment facilities from the Saudis themselves, or designing systems that would allow the United States to disable—or even destroy remotely—the facilities if necessary.

The fact that such safeguards were seriously contemplated should itself have been a warning. If your proposal requires extraordinary mechanisms to prevent your own ally from using the technology you are providing, perhaps the proposal is fundamentally flawed.

4. This may prove a stepping stone toward an even greater disaster: Security Guarantees for Saudi

As Rosemary Kelanic points out, this deal provides Riyadh with leverage it can use in the future to force Washington to provide it with security guarantees. Saudi Arabia can threaten to build nuclear weapons unless the U.S. offers it Article 5-level security guarantees - a disastrous move that would further entangle the US in the region militarily instead of allowing America to come home from the Middle East.

As Kelanic argues, there is ample historical precedent. South Korea and West Germany both advanced nuclear programs that alarmed Washington. Rather than allowing them to acquire nuclear weapons, the United States ultimately strengthened its military commitments and security guarantees in exchange for abandoning those programs.

As a result, this nuclear deal may prove to be a prelude to an even more damaging concession to Saudi down the road.

5. This likely weakens Washington’s negotiating position with Iran.

If there is eventually another U.S.-Iran nuclear agreement, today’s decision establishes an entirely new benchmark.

It becomes impossible to argue that Saudi Arabia may enrich uranium while Iran cannot, although Tehran was never going to accept zero enrichment in the first place. But proposals that earlier had been entertained - such as a 5- to 10-year moratorium on enrichment - may now also be out of reach.

Moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it becomes harder to insist on intrusive international inspections for Iran while accepting a far lighter non-IAEA inspection regime for Saudi Arabia. And it becomes much more difficult to portray enrichment itself as an unacceptable proliferation risk.

Washington has made the type of deal it wants from Iran more complicated.

6. Israel has every reason to be deeply unhappy.

Much attention will focus on the loss of the Saudi normalization card, which has been one of Israel’s strategic objectives.

But the more consequential issue may be that Saudi Arabia now appears to have a far more credible pathway toward a nuclear weapons capability should it ever choose to pursue one.

That represents a fundamental shift in Israel’s long-term strategic environment.

7. Is this about widening the war with Iran?

Possibly. One interpretation is that Washington made these concessions to secure greater Saudi cooperation in the current (or a future) confrontation with Tehran.

But Tehran itself does not appear particularly alarmed.

Saudi Arabia’s direct military contribution to a war with Iran would likely remain limited, and the Kingdom’s participation does little to alter Iran’s fundamental geographic advantages in the Persian Gulf. More importantly, Saudi leaders have spent years trying to reduce—not increase—the risk of becoming a battlefield in a U.S.-Iran conflict.

If that remains Riyadh’s strategic priority, this agreement is unlikely to fundamentally change the military balance in the war.

Taken together, it is difficult to see today’s announcement as advancing US interest, let alone being compatible with other existing efforts such as finding an acceptable resolution to the conflict with Iran. It raises further questions as to whether a cohesive Middle East policy exists.