The important change in Iran's latest response to Trump

The Iranian counter-proposal is publicly rejected by Trump, but if WSJ reporting is correct, Tehran is trying to move closer to US demands, but not fully.

The US demands that the entire Iranian stockpile be shipped out of the country. In the past, Tehran rejected shipping any of it out; it only agreed to downblending it. In its latest proposal, however, it offers to have some of it diluted and the rest shipped to a third country. The exact proportions are unclear.

As I understand it, though thi sis not reported by the WSJ, Iran is also offering to accept an arrangement in which it will not need to enrich uranium at all for 12 years. This is not the 15-20 years Trump originally wanted, but longer than the 3-5 years Terhan originally offered.

That Iran is willing to pause enrichment at all is a significant concession that I am not sure is fully appreciated by the American side. Last time Iran did this, it backfired significantly.

As I explain in Treacheorus Alliance, through the mediation of the E3, Tehran agreed to a voluntary suspension of enrichment in 2003. This was a significant victory for European diplomacy.

Though the suspension was supposed to be temporary until a final solution was found, its duration was tied to the continuation of talks. Meaning, as long as the two sides continued to negotiate for a final agreement, Tehran was supposed to sustain the suspension.

But once Iran had suspended, Europe had achieved its main goal. It was in no rush to reach a final agreement because such an agreement would inevitably have Iran restart enrichment. The Iranians soon concluded that, intentional or not, the suspension had turned into a trap.

But the cost of the suspension mistake in their view only grew.

In August 2005, after two years of suspension, Iran announced it would restart enrichment. By January, enrichment recommenced.

Immediately, a crisis erupted, and only a month later, the IAEA Board of Governors referred Iran’s case to the UN Security Council (February 4, 2006).

This started the process that led to numerous UNSC sanctions being imposed on Iran.

In the Iranian narrative, the suspension trapped Iran into a scenario in which the world expected it not to enrich indefinitely, and Iran was then forced to pay a massive cost once it ended the voluntary suspension.

If Iran once again agrees to a moratorium or suspension - even if framed differently - the fear is that this will normalize Iran not enriching, and once Iran resumes enrichment for peaceful purposes after 12 or whatever years, a new crisis will erupt, and Iran will once again face sanctions and economic punishment.

Even though in this recent proposal to the US, the suspension is tied to Iran’s needs for two of its reactors, it is nevertheless a major Iranian concession.

Trump could easily point to this and declare victory.

It remains unclear to me why this and the stockpile have become so central in Trump’s perspective. His earlier red line was simply no nuclear weapons.

He shifted to no enrichment due to pressure from Israel in mid-2025. Still, for Trump to even agree to a 20-year moratorium is a deviation from the Israeli red line (Israel wants Iran to permanently cease enrichment).

But the insistence on shipping the entire stockpile out appears to be another example of Trump allowing America’s red lines to be replaced by Israel’s.

It would be a shame if the entire negotiation collapses over this issue.