Netanyahu defies Trump and strikes back at Iran - but can he take on Tehran without the US?

But by defying Trump, Israel has done more than challenge Iran's new equation; it has also undermined Trump's credibility.

Israel has now responded militarily to Iran, defying Trump’s publicly expressed wishes. Israeli commentators have been explicit that Israel could not allow Iran to establish a new regional equation—one in which Tehran successfully extended deterrence over Lebanon.

But by defying Trump, Israel has done more than challenge Iran’s new equation; it has also undermined Trump’s credibility.

The ball is now back in both Tehran’s and Trump’s court.

If Israel’s defiance carries no consequences, it will reinforce the view in Iran that Trump either cannot or will not restrain Israel. From Tehran’s perspective, a deal with Washington has little value if the United States is unable—or unwilling—to curb Israeli actions. An unconstrained Israel would only increase the likelihood of renewed conflict and continued efforts to draw the United States back into war.

Trump, meanwhile, appears unwilling to spend the political capital necessary to rein in Netanyahu—beyond angry phone calls and tough public statements— unless he knows that he has a deal with Iran.

Taking on Israel is no easy task in Washington. From Trump’s perspective, it is only worth doing if an agreement with Iran is already secured. In short, Trump is willing to restrain Israel to preserve a deal, but not to obtain one.

Iran, however, wants evidence that Trump can restrain Israel before agreeing to a deal.

As a result, the most likely scenario is another round of Iranian and Israeli strikes, with Trump declining to meaningfully constrain Israel.

The key question is whether Trump will eventually enter the conflict—or be pulled into it.

The Iranians appear prepared for either outcome. If Trump re-enters the war, Tehran may employ options it withheld during the previous conflict, including disrupting Red Sea shipping and targeting GCC oil infrastructure in an effort to drive oil prices well above $200 per barrel.

If Trump stays out, such horizontal escalation may be deemed unnecessary. Instead, Tehran will seek to exhaust Israel’s air defenses and further deplete its stockpile of interceptors.

A growing consensus in Iran holds that agreeing to a ceasefire after 12 days of fighting in June 2025 was a mistake. Tehran believes Israel had become acutely vulnerable after roughly ten days of war, as its interceptor inventory was being rapidly depleted while Iran retained substantial missile capacity.

Although Iran expects to absorb significant damage from Israeli strikes, Iranian decision-makers believe Israel cannot sustain another two or three weeks of active conflict without massive American support. Iran possesses more missiles than Israel has interceptors, and Israel typically expends multiple interceptors to destroy a single Iranian missile. In Tehran’s view, the arithmetic favors Iran.

All of this can still be avoided. Iran has reportedly submitted what appears to be a comprehensive response to the MOU. The principal sticking point is Tehran’s demand that $12 billion in frozen Iranian assets be released at the outset of the agreement.

Trump has so far refused. If he relents, however, the MOU could be signed within days. Tehran would then be obligated to uphold the region-wide ceasefire, and Trump would have the diplomatic achievement necessary to justify restraining Israel.

Perhaps this is precisely what Tehran is counting on. After all, Mohammad Bagher Qalibaf, Iran’s lead negotiator in Islamabad, recently tweeted: “We seize concessions not through dialogue, but with missiles; in negotiations, we merely make them understand.”